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The Undiscovered Country:
Wyoming’s Emergence as a
Leading Trust Situs Jurisdiction
Christopher M. Reimer *
A certain Jarndyce, in an evil hour, made a great, fortune and made
a great will. In the question how the trusts under that will are to be
administered, the fortune left by the will is squandered away; the
legatees under the will are reduced to such a miserable condition
that they would be sufficiently punished if they had committed an
enormous crime in having money left them . . . .
Charles Dickens, Bleak House
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I. Introduction
The modern rules governing trusts allow for opportunities only dreamed
of by the beneficiaries of Dickens’ Jarndyce and Jarndyce.1 Over the last several
decades, as the world has “become flat,” U.S. states have adopted increasinglyvaried trust laws and, more recently, as the federal Hiring Incentives to Restore
Employment (HIRE) Act attempts to close a number of so-called offshore trust
loopholes, wealth management professionals and their clients have more closely
scrutinized onshore trust jurisdictions for the best possible situs.2 This attention
has prompted new trust legislation in a number of states and much discussion
between experts as to the relative merits of various jurisdictions.3
Modern trust statutes, along with a number of other factors including low
or non-existent state income taxes, the abolishment or expansion of the Rule
Against Perpetuities, and the passage of asset protection laws, have launched a
handful of states to the top of the list of beneficial trust situs jurisdictions. Alaska,
Delaware, Nevada, New Hampshire, and South Dakota join Wyoming as leading
trust situs jurisdictions.4 Given its strong asset protection laws, lack of income
1

See infra notes 5–8 and accompanying text (providing a basic overview of trusts).

See Hiring Incentives to Restore Employment (HIRE) Act, Pub. L. No. 111-147,
§§ 531–532, 124 Stat. 71, 113–14 (2010) (to be codified at 26 U.S.C. § 679).
2

3
See, e.g., Iris J. Goodwin, How the Rich Stay Rich: Using a Family Trust Company to Secure
a Family Fortune, 40 Seton Hall L. Rev. 467, 485–87 (2010); Duncan E. Osborne & Mark E.
Osborne, Asset Protection: Trust Planning, SR034 A.L.I.-A.B.A. 201, 230–45 (2010); David G.
Shaftel, Comparison of the Twelve Domestic Asset Protection Statutes, 34 ACTEC J. 293 passim (2009);
Daniel G. Worthington & Marc Merric, Which Situs is Best?, Tr. & Est., Jan. 2010, at 54; Jerry
Cooper, America’s Most Wealth Friendly States Continue to Bid for Your Clients’ Trust Business, Tr.
Advisor Blog (Jan. 15, 2010), http://thetrustadvisor.com/news/states.

See, e.g., Osborne & Osborne, supra note 3, at 230; Worthington & Merric, supra note 3,
at 54; Cooper, supra note 3.
4
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taxes, and recently revised Limited Liability Company (LLC) statutes, Wyoming
is quickly outpacing other top trust situs states in terms of attracting new business.
This article compares Wyoming to other popular jurisdictions and addresses the
reasons advisors and their clients looking to create or resettle an onshore trust, as
well as those considering migrating offshore holdings, should put Wyoming at the
top of their list of trust-friendly jurisdictions.
At its most elemental level, a trust is a conveyance of property in which legal
title is given to a trustee and equitable title to a beneficiary.5 The trustee, or legal
title holder, is under an obligation to maintain or distribute trust property for
the benefit of the beneficiary as per the terms of the trust.6 Such a division of
title can serve a number of purposes: it can protect a beneficiary’s assets from the
beneficiary’s own poor judgment or from the beneficiary’s creditors by vesting
control of distributions in another person or entity; it serves as a vehicle to
minimize estate and generation-skipping transfer taxes; it is a way of providing
for family members with special needs or for pets long after their now-living
caregivers are gone; and it can act as a vehicle to safeguard and grow assets for
generations to come.7 Trusts have historically been employed by the very wealthy;
however, as they have grown in popularity over the last few decades, their use as an
estate planning tool has expanded among the middle and upper-middle classes.
As the jurisdiction in which a trust is created establishes the governing law relative
to it, situs is an important matter for anyone considering establishing a trust or
migrating one that already exists.8
The Uniform Trust Code (UTC), approved in 2000 by the National
Conference of Commissioners on Uniform State Laws, is the first comprehensive
act on trusts in the United States.9 A general need for guidance in an era of
increased interest in trust creation and only minimal statutory authority in most
states prompted its drafting. While the UTC has been adopted, at least in part,
by most jurisdictions, a number have enacted statutes that go further in terms
5

76 Am. Jur. 2d Trusts § 1 (2010).

6

Id.; Restatement (Second) of Trusts § 2 (1959).

7
See infra Part III.F (addressing the asset protection advantages of spendthrift trusts and
creditor protection); infra Part III.A–B (discussing tax implications to trust assets including the
Generation-Skipping Transfer Tax); infra Part III.D.4 (focusing on special purpose trusts); infra
notes 51–63 (addressing long-term dynasty trusts).

The law of the jurisdiction in which a trust is created typically governs questions of
its validity and construction; questions of administration are governed by either the law of
the jurisdiction specified by the settlor or the law of the jurisdiction with the most substantial
relationship to the trust’s administration. See Restatement (Second) of Conflict of Laws
§§ 268–72 (1971); 7 Austin W. Scott, Mark. L. Ascher & William F. Fratcher, Scott and
Ascher on Trusts §§ 45.3–.5 (5th ed. 2008).
8

A copy of the UTC with complete comments can be accessed through the National
Conference of Commissioners on Uniform State Laws (NCCUSL) website, available at http://
www.nccusl.org/Update/.
9
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of added creditor protection, increased flexibility with respect to self-settled
trusts, and provisions for trust protectors.10 Wyoming has adopted the UTC
but has made over 100 substantive changes—resulting in an especially settlorfriendly code.11

II. The Implications of the Hiring Incentives to
Restore Employment Act on Offshore Trusts
A. Background
While the protections and benefits of onshore trusts have grown increasingly
variable and sophisticated within select U.S. jurisdictions, settlors have and
continue to avail themselves of offshore trust locations for a number of reasons.
First, foreign trusts are more difficult to access.12 Second, foreign jurisdictions are
free from the constraints imposed by the United States Constitution.13 Third,
foreign jurisdictions allow self-settled trusts while, for many years, the general
rule in U.S. jurisdictions was that trusts in which the settlor is also a beneficiary
were against the tenets of conscionability.14 Finally, for the past fifty years, the
U.S. Internal Revenue Code has been structured so that settlors were allowed to
take advantage of a number of estate and income tax minimization techniques,
further guarding the corpus of a trust and allowing unencumbered growth in
foreign jurisdictions.
Countering this, however, is the fact that many foreign locales stipulate that
at least one trustee local to the foreign jurisdiction be named, a detail that for

A summary of which states have adopted portions of the UTC can be accessed through the
NCCUSL website, available at http://www.nccusl.org/Update/.
10

11
Mark Merric et al., Wyoming Enters DAPT Legislation Arena, Steve Leimberg’s Asset
Protection Plan. Email Newsl., no. 109, July 2007, available at http://www.hro.com/files/file/
publications/Merric/Asset_Protection_Planning/Domestic_Asset_Protection_Trusts/domestic
assetprotection1.pdf; see Wyo. Stat. Ann. §§ 4-10-101 to -1103 (2010) (encompassing Wyoming’s
Uniform Trust Code).
12
While a creditor may be able to get a judgment against a debtor in the United States, in
order to reach offshore assets to satisfy the judgment, the creditor often has to sue the debtor in the
offshore jurisdiction.
13
The Constitutional “full faith and credit” mandate requires the courts of one state to
recognize the judgments from courts in another state—meaning a state may be required to recognize
judgments from a state that is less debtor-friendly. U.S. Const. art. IV, § 1; see Osborne & Osborne,
supra note 3, at 245–50. Some commentators argue that asset protection laws may violate the
Contract Clause of the U.S. Constitution. U.S. Const. art. I, § 10; see Osborne & Osborne, supra
note 3, at 255. Finally, the Supremacy Clause prohibits states from protecting debtors from federal
law, such as in a bankruptcy proceeding. U.S. Const. art. VI, cl. 2; see Osborne & Osborne, supra
note 3, at 250–55.
14
See John E. Sullivan III, Gutting the Rule Against Self-Settled Trusts: How the New Delaware
Trust Law Competes with Offshore Trusts, 23 Del. J. Corp. L. 423, 425–26 (1998).
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many settlors means surrendering more control than they would like.15 The risk
of political upheaval, potentially unenforceable trust terms, and unaccountable
trustees may also give pause to investors.16 Furthermore, several domestic
jurisdictions, Wyoming top among them, now allow for the formation of selfsettled asset protection trusts.17 With the recent passage of federal laws such as the
HIRE Act, a number of tax implications that once made placing trusts in offshore
jurisdictions attractive have disappeared. In their wake are higher penalties
and increased reporting responsibilities imposed upon a broader selection of
foreign trusts.18 As the holders of offshore trusts perceive the benefits of foreign
jurisdictions abate, they are bringing their trust assets onshore; Wyoming is one
of the states to which interested parties are increasingly migrating such trusts.

B. The Hiring Incentives to Restore Employment Act and the Foreign
Account Tax Compliance Act
On March 18, 2010, President Barack Obama signed into law House
Resolution 2847, the HIRE Act.19 As its name suggests, the Act focuses on
job creation by providing tax incentives to businesses that hire and retain new
employees. To offset the revenue losses created by these incentives, as well as to
deal with several perceived reporting loopholes related to the taxation of offshore
investments by U.S. residents, Congress included the Foreign Account Tax
Compliance Act (FATCA), which increases taxation, reporting requirements, and
enforcement for offshore accounts and trusts.20 Most notably for the purposes
of this article, FATCA affects the playing field for foreign trusts with U.S.
beneficiaries by identifying a broader selection of trusts considered to have U.S.
beneficiaries, increasing reporting requirements, and imposing higher penalties
on taxpayers who fail to report or underreport trust income, use of trust property,
or assets settled into a foreign trust.21 Overall, FATCA significantly narrows the
See generally Osborne & Osborne, supra note 3, at 275–94 (assessing various offshore
jurisdictions and their requirements).
15

16

See George Gleason Bogert et al., Bogert’s Trusts and Trustees § 223 (2010).

See, e.g., Alaska Stat. § 34.40.110 (2010); Del. Code Ann. tit. 12, §§ 3570–3576
(2010); S.D. Codified Laws §§ 55-16-1 to -17 (2010); Wyo. Stat. Ann. §§ 4-10-505, -510 to
-523 (2010); see infra Part III.F.1 (discussing the advantages of Wyoming’s Qualified Spendthrift
Trust legislation).
17

With regard to trusts settled in foreign jurisdictions, this article concerns itself with trusts
having U.S. beneficiaries. For more information on foreign-settled trusts whose beneficiaries are
non-resident aliens, see G. Warren Whitaker, The U.S. May Be a Good Trust Jurisdiction for Foreign
Persons, 33 Est. Plan. 36 (2006).
18

19
HIRE Act, Pub. L. No. 111-147, 124 Stat. 71 (2010) (to be codified in scattered sections
of 26 U.S.C.).
20

The FATCA provisions are included in Title V, Subtitle A of the HIRE Act.

See Gregory J. Dean & Michael A. Heimos, The 2010 “FATCAt” Legislation and FBAR
Proposals, in 2 The Law of Transnational Business Transactions § 11:13 (Ved P. Nanda & Ralph
B. Lake eds., 2010); Todd Y. McArthur et al., Recent U.S. Tax Bills Target Offshore Tax Abuse, 21 J.
21
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appeal of offshore trust jurisdictions to U.S. investors. As the impact of the HIRE
Act and FATCA reverberates through the next few tax years, more and more
U.S. clients will reconsider the pros and cons of foreign trust jurisdictions, likely
finding they can get many of the same benefits with fewer attendant risks by
resettling their trusts in a U.S. jurisdiction.
In order to more clearly assess the impact of FATCA, a closer look at the details
of the Act is warranted. With respect to foreign trusts with a U.S. beneficiary,
FATCA expands the definition of what is considered a foreign trust benefitting a
U.S. person, thereby subjecting more trusts to certain U.S. taxation and reporting
requirements.22 Since 1996, the Internal Revenue Code has distinguished between
foreign and domestic trusts for U.S. tax purposes by stating a trust is domestic if
“(i) a court within the United States is able to exercise primary supervision over
the administration of the trust, and (ii) one or more United States persons have
the authority to control all substantial decisions of the trust.”23 Consequently, a
trust created by a U.S. transferor for the benefit of one or more U.S. beneficiaries
managed only by a foreign trustee is treated as a grantor trust and is subject to
taxation by the United States on its worldwide income.24
FATCA cuts a wider swath than the former version of the Internal Revenue
Code when assessing which foreign trusts have a U.S. beneficiary. First,
U.S. persons with interests in a trust contingent on a future event are now
unequivocally considered U.S. beneficiaries and are responsible for the new
reporting requirements.25 Second, if under the terms of a foreign trust any person
has the discretion to make a distribution for the benefit of any person, the trust is
presumed to have a U.S. beneficiary, unless “(A) the terms of the trust specifically
identify the class of persons to whom the distributions may be made, and
(B) none of those persons are United States persons during the taxable year.”26
This presumption may be overcome only if the person who directly or indirectly
transfers property to a foreign trust submits information to the Secretary of the
Treasury showing the trust has no U.S. beneficiaries.27 Third, FATCA expands
Int’l Tax’n 24, 34–36 (2010); Tom O’Donnell & Michael Parets, FATCA: An Analysis, 21 J. Int’l
Tax’n 24, 63–64 (2010). See generally Kevin E. Packman & Andrew H. Weinstein, FBAR—Foreign
Bank Account Reporting Obligations: A Primer for the Practitioner, 106 J. Tax’n 44 (2007) (giving an
overview of foreign account reporting requirements).
22

See infra notes 33–38 and accompanying text.

23

26 U.S.C. § 7701(a)(30)(E) (2006).

24

Id. § 679.

HIRE Act, Pub. L. No. 111-147, § 531(a), 124 Stat. 71, 113 (2010) (to be codified at 26
U.S.C. § 679(c)).
25

Id. § 531(b) (to be codified at § 679(c)); see also Treas. Reg. § 1.679-2(a)(2)(ii), -2(a)(2)
(iii), exs. (10), (11) (2010).
26

HIRE Act § 532(a) (to be codified at § 679(d)). The presumption that a foreign trust has a
U.S. beneficiary can be overcome if the terms of the trust communicate that none of the income or
principal could be paid or accrue for the benefit of a U.S. person or, if the trust is terminated within
27
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the scope of foreign trust terms by stating that an “agreement or understanding
(whether written, oral, or otherwise)” resulting in the income or corpus of the
trust accruing to or for the benefit of a U.S. person shall be considered a term of
the trust.28 These provisions will result in required filings by many more foreign
trusts than under previous law.29
Regarding the use of trust property, previous law treated a loan by a foreign
trust to a U.S. grantor, U.S. beneficiary, or related U.S. person as a distribution by
the foreign trust to that U.S. person unless the loan was later repaid or cancelled.30
FATCA stipulates any uncompensated use of foreign trust property, including a
loan of cash or marketable securities, by a U.S. person who is a grantor, beneficiary,
or related to a U.S. grantor or beneficiary, will be treated as a distribution to the
extent of the fair market rental value of the property or amount of the loan.31 If
such person compensates the trust for the use of property or repays the loan at a
market rate of interest within a reasonable time, then the section does not apply.32
FATCA also ups the ante with regard to reporting requirements for U.S.
owners of interests in foreign trusts and increases the attendant penalties for
non- or under-reporting.33 Any U.S. person treated as an owner of any portion
of a foreign trust under the grantor trust rules must provide information about
the trust to comply with reporting obligations.34 Exactly what information will
have to be reported has not yet been determined, but this requirement erodes
the promise of privacy so sought after by many of those who settle trusts in
foreign locales.35
For failing to report, the initial penalty is now the greater of $10,000 or five
percent of the value of the portion of a grantor trust owned by a U.S. person, thirtythe year, none of the income or principal could be paid or used for the benefit of a U.S. person. Id.;
see 26 U.S.C. § 679(c)(1) (2006).
28

HIRE Act § 531(c) (to be codified at § 679(c)(5)).

29

See id.

26 U.S.C. § 643(i); McArthur et al., supra note 21, at 35; see HIRE Act § 533 (to be
codified at § 643(i)).
30

31

HIRE Act § 533(c) (to be codified at § 679(c)).

32

Id.

Id. §§ 534–535 (to be codified at §§ 6048(b), 6677(a)). Prior to FATCA, an owner of an
interest in a foreign trust was only responsible for ensuring that the trust made a return furnishing
the requisite information. See 26 U.S.C. § 6677 (West Supp. 2009), amended by HIRE Act § 534.
FATCA inserted language requiring the owner to submit such information as prescribed by the
Secretary of the Treasury. HIRE Act § 534(a).
33

HIRE Act § 534 (to be codified at § 6048(b)) (governing reporting obligations imposed on
those who create, make transfers to, or receive distributions from foreign trusts).
34

35
Id. The only published guidance to date is I.R.S. Notice 2010-60, addressing § 501 of the
HIRE Act, which covers reporting requirements imposed on foreign financial institutions. I.R.S.
Notice 2010-60, 2010-37 I.R.B. 329 (Sept. 13, 2010).

Published by Law Archive of Wyoming Scholarship, 2011

7

Wyoming Law Review, Vol. 11 [2011], No. 1, Art. 6

172

Wyoming Law Review

Vol. 11

five percent of the value of property transferred to a foreign trust by a U.S. person
who does not report the transfer, or thirty-five percent of the distribution amount
to a beneficiary who fails to report distribution.36 Additionally, Congress retained
the provision in § 6677 imposing a $10,000 penalty for each thirty-day period for
which a failure to file continues after an initial ninety-day grace period beginning
when the Internal Revenue Service notifies the person of the requirement to file.37
In no event, however, can penalties exceed the gross reportable amount.38
With recent legislation in a number of states, including Wyoming, allowing
for the creation of self-settled trusts, combined with the implications of the
FATCA provisions, the shine of foreign trust jurisdictions is beginning to
tarnish. Wyoming allows for self-settled trusts, protects the privacy of settlors and
beneficiaries, and does not tax trust income, with the result that trusts settled in
Wyoming are subject to the same U.S. tax as foreign trusts with U.S. beneficiaries,
without exposing clients to the potential risks of unenforceable trust terms and
lack of control that can arise when foreign trustees are involved.39

III. Onshore Trust Situs Considerations:
Wyoming as an Emerging Trust Situs
This section provides an overview of many issues clients and their advisors
should consider when creating, migrating, or resettling a trust in Wyoming. Such
issues include the Rule Against Perpetuities, tax and privacy implications, various
modern trust laws, the availability of private family trust companies, and asset
protection statutes.

36
HIRE Act § 535 (to be codified at § 6677(a)). This provision applies to returns filed after
December 31, 2009. Id.
37

Id.

38

Id.

Regarding transfer tax implications of offshore and onshore jurisdictions, one commen
tator observes:
39

[T]he transfer tax consequences of establishing a foreign trust and a domestic trust
are identical. Thus, if there are no NRA [non-resident alien] beneficiaries, the grantor
should consider establishing the trust in a United States jurisdiction. A suitable choice
would be . . . [a] state that permits the grantor to retain a discretionary interest in the
trust while shielding the assets from the reach of the grantor’s future creditors. One
significant advantage of doing so would be to circumvent the throwback regime and
the interest charge on distributions of accumulated income to U.S. persons. Another
advantage would be to avoid the reporting requirements to which any United States
beneficiary, the trustee, or the grantor of the trust would otherwise be subject.
Alternatively, the grantor may wish to establish two trusts—a foreign trust that
generates foreign-source income for distribution to NRAs and a domestic trust that
generates income from whatever source for distribution to United States persons.
Mark W. Smith, Careful Pre-Immigration Planning Can Save Significant Taxes, 34 Est. Plan. 30, 33
(2007) (citations omitted).
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A. The Rule Against Perpetuities and the Generation-Skipping Transfer Tax
The Rule Against Perpetuities (RAP) has long been a thorn in the sides of
those wishing to create perpetual trusts to hold a family’s assets for as long as
the family may last. The common law RAP guards against such “dead hand”
maneuvering by stating a property interest is not valid unless it vests not later than
twenty-one years (plus a reasonable period for gestation) after some life in being
at the creation of the interest.40 When Congress adopted the generation-skipping
transfer (GST) tax in 1976 and its amended version in 1986, it premised the
structure of the tax on the existence of the RAP or the Uniform Statutory Rule
Against Perpetuities (USRAP), which limits the duration of a trust to the RAP
or ninety years, whichever is greater. While a number of jurisdictions abolished
the RAP before the adoption of the GST tax, the tax itself prompted many more
states to eliminate the RAP, extend it significantly, or amend their statutes to allow
donors of trusts to opt out.41
Created in an effort to prevent one or more generations from escaping gift
or estate tax as property passed to them, the GST tax is imposed when a taxable
event occurs that passes property through a trust or otherwise to a person younger
by two generations or more than the person transferring the property.42 Such a
taxable event occurs in three situations: (1) a direct skip, (2) a taxable termination,
or (3) a taxable distribution.43 A direct skip occurs when a transfer is made to
a person more than one generation below the transferor, or, if the parties are
unrelated, to a person more than thirty-seven-and-a-half years younger than the
transferor.44 With respect to trusts, such a transaction is treated as a direct skip if
property is transferred to a trust in which all beneficiaries meet the requirements
of a skip person as described above.45 The Internal Revenue Code also treats the

40

John Chipman Gray, The Rule Against Perpetuities 191 (4th ed. 1942).

See Goodwin, supra note 3, at 485–86; Richard W. Nenno, Perpetual Dynasty Trusts: Tax
Planning and Jurisdiction Selection, SR034 A.L.I.-A.B.A. 1569, 1620 (2010); Max M. Schanzenbach
& Robert H. Sitkoff, Perpetuities or Taxes? Explaining the Rise of the Perpetual Trust, 27 Cardozo L.
Rev. 2465, 2466–70 (2006); Stewart E. Sterk, Jurisdictional Competition to Abolish the Rule Against
Perpetuities: R.I.P. for the R.A.P., 24 Cardozo L. Rev. 2097, 2097–2105 (2003); William J. Turnier
& Jeffrey L. Harrison, A Malthusian Analysis of the So-Called Dynasty Trust, 28 Va. Tax Rev. 779,
787–88 (2009). Among the top trust situs states, Alaska, Delaware, New Hampshire, and South
Dakota have eliminated the RAP. Nevada has extended the RAP for up to 365 years, and Wyoming
has extended it for up to 1000 years.
41

42
The GST tax is codified under Chapter 13 of the Internal Revenue Code. See 26 U.S.C.
§ 2613(a)(1) (2006); Michael E. O’Connor, Generation Skipping Transfer Tax: Questions and Answers
for the Estate Planner, N.Y. St. B. J., Apr. 1994, at 20, 20. A trust is fully exempt from the GST tax
if it was created or made irrevocable before October 22, 1986.
43

26 U.S.C. § 2612.

44

Id. § 2612(c); see id. § 2613(a)(1) (defining a “skip person”).

45

Id. § 2613(a)(2).
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termination of an interest in property held in a trust wherein all of the beneficiaries
are skip persons as a taxable event.46 Finally, a trust distribution to a beneficiary
who is a skip person constitutes a taxable distribution.47
While the GST tax includes a number of exemptions, the one most relevant
to this discussion is embodied in the amended version of the GST tax. Adopted in
1986, the amended version of the GST tax allows individuals to transfer a certain
dollar amount of property at death without paying transfer taxes, including
estate, gift, and GST taxes.48 By funding a trust with the exempt amount, future
generations will benefit from the trust’s appreciation free of the implications of
any transfer taxes for as long as the governing jurisdiction’s perpetuities rule allows,
thereby prompting states to abolish or expand their RAP statutes to attract trust
business.49 Therefore, in a number of trust jurisdictions, including Wyoming,
a properly-formed trust exists outside the federal transfer tax system, meaning
during the trust’s life, gift, estate, and GST taxes do not apply and control of trust
assets stays in the hands of those named by the settlor and future beneficiaries.50
Wyoming has enacted a 1000 year limit on multigenerational trusts (a termof-years approach), meaning that a valid trust in Wyoming must vest within 1000
years.51 Currently, a number of states including Delaware, Idaho, South Dakota,
and Wisconsin allow a trust to exist indefinitely. In terms of avoiding the GST
tax, both abolishing the RAP as well as the term-of-years approach work equally
well.52 Aside from the policy reasons many states cite for keeping the RAP or
some extended version of it, several authors have noted that while the idea of a
perpetual trust sounds appealing, the reality may be less so.53 Over time, the tax
burden and administrative costs may reduce a trust’s revenue enough that inflation,
the expectations of future generations, as well as the ever-expanding number of
beneficiaries will nullify the ability of the trust to live up to the expectations of its

46

Id. § 2612(a)(1).

47

Id. § 2612(b).

Id. §§ 2631(c), 2010(c). For example, the excludable amount in 2009 was $3,500,000. Id.
§ 2010(c).
48

49

See Schanzenbach & Sitkoff, supra note 41, at 2467–70, 2476–80.

50

See Sterk, supra note 41, at 2100.

Wyo. Stat. Ann. § 34-1-139 (2010). Wyoming’s constitution forbids perpetuities; thus the
Wyoming legislature extended rather than abolished the RAP. The 1000 year RAP was enacted at
the same time as the UTC with an effective date of July 1, 2003.
51

52

See Worthington & Merric, supra note 3, at 55.

For a discussion of policy reasons behind the RAP, including promoting the alienability
of land and intergenerational equity, encouraging entrepreneurial undertakings, limiting the
time beneficial ownership and control can be separate, and limiting the duration of spendthrift
restrictions, see Sterk, supra note 41, at 2109–77. See also Paul G. Haskell, A Proposal for a Simple
and Socially Effective Rule Against Perpetuities, 66 N.C. L. Rev. 545, 548–49 (1988).
53
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settlor.54 Families expand over time; within several generations, a trust that would
have provided liberally for four or six descendants is split into twenty-four parts,
and this split only increases with each successive generation. As a result, while the
term-of-years approach is not indefinite, in the very strictest sense, Wyoming’s
1000 year extension encompasses a span of generations that few of us can possibly
imagine and will outlive much current law. Such a span may, in the end, prove to
be a useful limit.
One final issue to note with respect to various jurisdictions’ RAP or lack
thereof is the so-called Delaware tax trap. Delaware originally enacted a statute
providing that the exercise of a limited power of appointment would reset the
RAP period to the date on which such power was executed.55 Delaware’s original
statute, now changed, made it possible to create a perpetual trust even under the
RAP by using successive limited powers of appointment.56 In response, Congress
enacted §§ 2514(d) and 2041(a)(3) of the Internal Revenue Code, stipulating if
a power of appointment is created after 1942 and is exercised to create another
power of appointment, the vesting may not occur “without regard to the date of
the creation of the first power.”57 As a result, states that have replaced the RAP
with a rule against the suspension of the power of alienation avoid the tax code
sections entirely.58 However, the Delaware tax trap may still pose problems if a
state has abolished the RAP but not also adopted a rule against the suspension of
the power of alienation.59 Without such a rule, no time limit exists within which
54

See Turnier & Harrison, supra note 41, at 789–97.

Del. Code Ann. tit. 25, § 503(c) (1999); Lynn Foster, Fifty-One Flowers: Current Perpetu
ities Law in the States, Prob. & Prop., Aug. 2008, at 30, 32–33. A person given a general power of
appointment under a trust may exercise such power in favor of anyone including the power holder,
the power holder’s estate, the power holder’s creditors, or the creditors of the power holder’s estate.
A limited power of appointment, also referred to as a special power of appointment, may be used in
favor of anyone except the power holder, the power holder’s estate, the power holder’s creditors, or
the creditors of the power holder’s estate.
55

56

Del. Code Ann. tit. 25, § 503(c); Foster, supra note 55, at 33.

26 U.S.C. §§ 2514(d), 2041(a)(3) (2006). A limited power of appointment is also
considered to exist if the power to make distributions is limited by an “ascertainable standard”
relating to health, education, support, and maintenance of the beneficiary. Id. § 2041(b)(1)(A);
see Worthington & Merric, supra note 3, at 56–57 (“Flexibility for future generations is often
achieved through other means, such as advisory committees, trust advisors with the power to direct
distributions, as well as removal and replacement powers.”).
57

Jesse Dukeminier & James E. Krier, The Rise of the Perpetual Trust, 50 UCLA L. Rev. 1303,
1333 (2003). The authors state:
58

The power of alienation is not suspended at all, and therefore an exercise of
a power does not suspend the power of alienation for a period of time that cannot
be ascertained by referring back to the creation of the trust. Thus successive special
powers of appointment can be created indefinitely in these states, without the trust
property being included in the donee’s taxable gross estate.
Id. The power of alienation refers to a trustee who holds the power to alienate, or sell, trust property.
Id. at 1313–14.
59

Id. at 1333–34.
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the trust interests must vest, meaning the value of the trust principle is included
in the settlor’s taxable estate.60
Most states have drafted their statutes in such a way as to avoid triggering
the Delaware tax trap. However, experts continue to disagree upon which state
statutes have sidestepped and which may still trigger the provision.61 While
some commentators argue an extended term-of-years approach to the RAP, like
Wyoming, avoids § 2041(a)(3), the consensus is not unanimous.62 While the
Delaware tax trap may not yet be put to rest in a number of onshore jurisdictions,
adding language to the trust itself effectively mitigates the problem.63
All in all, various states’ handling of the RAP have attracted a fair amount
of attention. While most issues with regard to the RAP have been adequately
dealt with in top trust situs states, the prudent advisor will nevertheless take the
aforementioned considerations into account when assisting clients in selecting the
most beneficial trust jurisdiction.

B. Ultra Tax Friendly
Another important consideration in deciding where to settle or migrate a
trust is the tax burden imposed by the jurisdiction. Taxing the income of a trust
results in constant erosion of assets, slower growth, and smaller trust distributions
to beneficiaries. States that tax trust income or impose a capital gains tax on trust
assets are significantly less advantageous to the client.
Many of the same states that have abolished or extended the RAP, including
Alaska, Nevada, South Dakota, and Wyoming, have also either abolished or
never imposed state tax on trust income. Delaware taxes resident income.64 New
Hampshire taxes dividends and interest.65 In addition to assessing no income tax
on trusts, Wyoming also has no individual or corporate income tax, no state gift
tax, no tax on out-of-state retirement income, no tax on mineral ownership, no
intangibles tax, no capital gains tax on trust income, and low property tax. The
likelihood of Wyoming ever adopting an income tax is extremely low in light
60

Id.

See Foster, supra note 55, at 33 (giving an overview of the ongoing discussion regarding the
Delaware tax trap).
61

62

See id.

For example, when decanting a trust, the new trust created by the exercise of the power
under the old trust should specify that the interests in it are “tested with reference to the creation of
the first trust.” Richard B. Covey & Dan T. Hastings, Recent Developments in Transfer and Income
Taxation of Trusts and Estates and State Trust and Estate Law, 43 Heckerling Inst. on Est. Plan.
¶ 100, ¶ 101.8[C], at 1-39 (2009). As a result, in a state like Wyoming, the new trust must vest
within 1000 years of the creation of the first trust.
63

64

Del. Code Ann. tit. 30, § 1102 (2010).

65

N.H. Rev. Stat. Ann. §§ 77:3–:4 (2010).
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of its constitutional provision essentially preventing such an imposition.66 In
addition, Wyoming’s vast reserves of coal, oil, and natural gas, and revenue from
severance taxes are what have and will remain available to offset the need for an
income tax.67
The tax imposed by various states on insurance premiums is often referred
to in the determination of trust situs but is only relevant in a narrow set of
situations—namely when a trust, generally one settled in a state with an abolished
or expanded RAP, purchases a high annual premium placement life insurance
policy.68 State insurance premium taxes are based on the annual premium amount
paid into a policy, thereby reducing the amount of premium that is able to grow
over time. South Dakota calls for 250 basis points (bp) (or 2.5%) paid on the first
$100,000 of annual premium and 8 bp (or .08%) on any amounts thereafter.69
Alaska imposes 270 bp on the first $100,000 of annual premium and 10 bp
thereafter.70 Wyoming assesses 75 bp, no matter the amount of annual premium.71
New Hampshire and Delaware impose 200 bp, and Nevada calls for 350 bp.72
When assessing trust situs jurisdictions for a client who plans to incorporate a
private placement life insurance policy into a trust, insurance premium tax
percentages are certainly part of the equation. The jurisdiction that will actually
impose the lowest tax will depend on the amount of annual premium paid.73
Wyo. Const. art. 15, § 18 (“No tax shall be imposed upon income without allowing
full credit against such tax liability for all sales, use, and ad valorem taxes paid in the taxable year
by the same taxpayer to any taxing authority in Wyoming.”). See generally Phil Roberts, A History
of the Wyoming Sales Tax: How Lawmakers Chose it from among Severance Taxes, an Income Tax,
Gambling, and a Lottery, 4 Wyo. L. Rev. 157 (2004) (outlining a complete history of Wyoming’s
taxation system).
66

See Wyoming State Government Revenue Forecast, Fiscal years 2010–2014, available
at http://eadiv.state.wy.us/creg/GreenCREG_Jan10.pdf.
67

The policies at issue in such situations are often high annual premium private placement
life insurance policies. See Al W. King III & Pierce H. McDowell III, Trust Administration: The
Domestic Advantage, in The PPLI Solution: Delivering Wealth Accumulation, Tax Efficiency,
and Asset Protection Through Private Placement Life Insurance 79, 80 (Kirk Loury ed., 2005)
(discussing how private placement life insurance can be used as a wealth management tool within a
trust). Private placement life insurance policies are a way for taxpayers to invest large sums of money
(often more than $1 million) and ensure tax-free compounded earnings managed according to the
taxpayer’s own choosing. Leslie C. Giordani et al., Private Placement Life Insurance Planning, SP017
A.L.I.-A.B.A. 829, 833–34 (2008). Such policies are attractive more for their use as an investment
vehicle than for their death benefits. Id.
68

69

S.D. Codified Laws § 10-44-2 (2010).

70

Alaska Stat. § 21.09.210 (2010).

71

Wyo. Stat. Ann. § 26-4-103 (2010).

N.H. Rev. Stat. Ann. § 400-A:32 (2010); Del. Code Ann. tit. 18, § 702 (2010); Nev.
Rev. Stat. § 680B.027 (2010).
72

73
It is relevant to note that retaliatory provisions may come into play in most states with respect
to insurance premium taxes. Such provisions state that if the company providing the insurance is
located in a different jurisdiction, the state may impose that other jurisdiction’s premium tax rate if
it is higher. See, e.g., Del. Code Ann. tit. 18, § 532.
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C. Privacy
While guarding the trust corpus is at the top of many clients’ lists, protecting
the family’s privacy is often of equally high concern. Some families prefer to
keep their names, assets, and any family business details out of the public eye.
While many top trust situs jurisdictions, including Delaware, South Dakota, and
Wyoming, do not require the recording of a trust or supervise its administration,
thereby keeping the trust out of the public record, some states do require such
recording and registration.74 Furthermore, if the trust becomes the subject of a
litigated dispute, the court may make trust information part of the public record.
Some states allow a trust to be structured so that it holds interest in an LLC,
which often requires public disclosure of certain information.75
Wyoming’s recently revised LLC statutes provide complete privacy to
a trust as a member of an LLC by only requiring disclosure of the registered
agent, completely shielding anyone with authority if the LLC so wishes.76
This provision of Wyoming’s LLC Act takes a different approach as compared
to the state’s former Act as well as to other states which generally require an
LLC to divulge whether it is member- or manager-managed and the names
of persons with authority to act.77 This change in Wyoming provides much
greater confidentiality and privacy to those registering an LLC.78 Therefore, a
trust whose assets are held by a Wyoming LLC can attain more privacy than in
other jurisdictions.
No other top trust situs state offers the kind of LLC-based privacy protection
now afforded by Wyoming.79 However, some other top trust situs states have
taken measures to protect trust confidentially. South Dakota, for example, allows

See, e.g., id. tit. 10, § 6504 (noting Delaware courts do not supervise the administration of a
trust unless called upon by an interested party to do so). But see Alaska Stat. § 13.36.005 (imposing
a duty to register trusts). See generally Bogert et al., supra note 16, § 64 (listing a number of states
that do and do not require trusts to be reported); Frances H. Foster, Trust Privacy, 93 Cornell L.
Rev. 555 (2008) (discussing the pros and cons of privacy laws as they relate to trusts).
74

75
See infra Part III.D.3 (addressing special purpose entities); infra Part III.E (regarding private
family trust companies); infra Part III.F.3 (explaining FLP and LLC charging order provisions).
Even in states requiring LLC disclosure, the experienced lawyer is often able to structure entities
within a trust to meet the state requirements and yet disclose little actual information about a client.
76

Wyo. Stat. Ann. §§ 17-29-203, -301, -302.

Dale W. Cottam et al., The 2010 Wyoming Limited Liability Company Act: A Uniform Recipe
with Wyoming “Home Cooking,” 11 Wyo. L. Rev. 49, 57, 61–63 (2011).
77

78

See id. at 57, 94–95.

See sources cited supra note 3 for articles discussing what constitutes a top trust situs.
Considerations include those discussed in this article, such as tax treatment, the extension or
abolition of the RAP, modern trust laws, private trust companies, and asset protection opportunities.
79
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those who establish a trust to petition to protect the privacy of a trust in any
judicial proceeding.80 Delaware also allows parties to petition to seal the court
record for three years upon a showing of good cause.81

D. Modern Trust Laws
Wyoming has taken a proactive approach to fostering a trust-friendly climate
by developing a comprehensive set of modern trust laws. These statutes allow for
increased flexibility in the management, amendment, and reformation of trusts.

1. Directed Trust Statutes
Directed trust statutes allow the trust instrument to appoint an independent
party, often called a trust advisor, to manage trust assets, thereby relieving the
trustee from management decision liability and allowing hand-selected advisors
(not necessarily located in Wyoming) to make sensitive decisions regarding trust
assets.82 By relieving the trustee from liability through vesting discretionary duties
in a third party, such statutes allow trust assets to be invested and managed in
increasingly creative and asset-appropriate directions. For example, the third
party with whom investment decision functions are vested may be a committee
comprised of people with expertise in each particular class of assets the trust
holds. Furthermore, by avoiding the prudent investor standard trustees often
work within, directed trust statutes allow management of the trust according to
a more or less risk-averse standard.83 While most states do not have directed trust
statutes, the top trust jurisdiction states including Alaska, Delaware, Nevada,
New Hampshire, South Dakota, and Wyoming have enacted them.84

2. Trust Protector Statutes
While a directed trust statute allows a settlor greater flexibility in the manner
in which trust assets are managed, a trust protector statute, for many years a
feature only available in offshore jurisdictions, provides flexibility with respect to
unforeseen changes that may need to be made in the future of the trust.85 A trust

80

S.D. Codified Laws § 21-22-28 (2010).

81

Del. Ch. Ct. R. 5(g)(3) (2010).

See Al W. King III & Pierce H. McDowell III, Delegated vs. Directed Trusts, Tr. & Est., July
2006, at 26.
82

83

See infra Part III.D.5 (discussing the prudent investor standard).

Alaska Stat. § 13.36.375 (2010); Del. Code Ann. tit. 12, § 3313 (2010); Nev. Rev.
Stat. § 163.5545 (2010); N.H. Rev. Stat. Ann. § 564-B:12-1201 (2010); S.D. Codified Laws
§ 55-1B-2; Wyo. Stat. Ann. § 4-10-712 (2010).
84

Bogert et al., supra note 16, § 992 (“Over the past decade, the use of a trust protector has
evolved from being used solely as a tool in offshore trusts to being a valuable asset in providing a
settlor with flexibility and control in a wide variety of domestic trusts.”); see Gregory S. Alexander,
85
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protector is a disinterested third party appointed by the trust and given powers
which may include the ability to modify some trust terms as the needs of future
generations, tax status, or governing law change. The powers given to the trust
protector depend upon what the jurisdiction’s law allows and, more specifically,
the powers set out in the trust instrument itself.86 The existence of statutes
recognizing trust protectors and delineating the scope of the powers that may be
given to them is an important addition to modern trust laws. All of the top trust
jurisdictions have effective trust protector laws: Alaska, Delaware, Nevada, New
Hampshire, South Dakota, and Wyoming.87 However, only South Dakota and
Wyoming enumerate comprehensive trust protector powers.88

3. Special Purpose Entities
Special purpose entities are often used in conjunction with directed trusts
and/or trust protectors. These separate, unregulated entities, often LLCs, offer
further protection from liability risk for trust advisors, trust protectors, and other
decision-making committees.89 In contrast to individual liability insurance, which
can be extremely difficult to obtain for a trust advisor or protector, it is possible
to obtain insurance coverage for a special purpose entity, further insulating its
members from liability. Such entities also provide legal continuity in the event
a trust protector or advisor resigns or dies. While no specific statutes authorize
the creation of special purpose entities, five jurisdictions currently permit
unregulated special purpose entities: Alaska, Delaware, Nevada, South Dakota,
and Wyoming.90

Trust Protectors: Who Will Watch the Watchmen?, 27 Cardozo L. Rev. 2807 passim (2006); Richard
C. Ausness, The Role of Trust Protectors in American Trust Law, 45 Real Prop., Tr. & Est. L.J. 319,
324 (2010); Jeffrey Evans Stake, A Brief Comment on Trust Protectors, 27 Cardozo L. Rev. 2813
passim (2006); Stewart E. Sterk, Trust Protectors, Agency Costs, and Fiduciary Duty, 27 Cardozo L.
Rev. 2761 passim (2006).
Potential trust protector powers include supervising trustees, modifying trust terms in
response to changed circumstances, supervising purpose trusts, advising fiduciaries, contributing to
continuity of administration, and arbitrating disputes. Ausness, supra note 85, at 327–33.
86

Alaska Stat. § 13.36.374; Del. Code Ann. tit. 12, § 3313; Nev. Rev. Stat. § 163.5553;
N.H. Rev. Stat. Ann. § 564-B:12-1201; S.D. Codified Laws § 55-1B-6; Wyo. Stat. Ann.
§ 4-10-710.
87

88
Ausness, supra note 85, at 350 (citing Wyo. Stat. Ann. § 4-10-410(a); S.D. Codified Laws
§ 55-1B-6; Alexander A. Bove, Jr., The Trust Protector: Trust Watchdog or Expensive Exotic Pet?, 30
Est. Plan. 390 (2003)).
89
See Worthington & Merric, supra note 3, at 58; supra notes 75–81 and accompanying text
(discussing Wyoming’s LLC privacy statutes).
90
See Alaska Stat. §§ 13.36.370, .375; Del. Code Ann. tit. 12, § 3313; Nev. Rev. Stat.
§ 163.5553; S.D. Codified Laws § 55-1B-6; Wyo. Stat. Ann. § 4-10-710.
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4. Purpose Trusts
The purpose trust was a unique creation by the drafters of the UTC.91
Traditionally, a trust has three elements: “a trustee, a corpus, and one or more
beneficiaries.”92 Aside from charitable trusts, the common law rule has long
required the existence of an ascertainable beneficiary.93 The two primary causes of
the unenforceability of purpose trusts were (1) the RAP and (2) the fact that no
one could sue to enforce the trust’s purpose.94 This created problems for settlors
seeking to create non-charitable trusts with no identifiable beneficiary, such as one
created to maintain and support a family pet, business, or collection of Charles
Bronson memorabilia.95 The UTC pioneered the concept of a non-charitable
honorary trust created for a specific purpose but without specified beneficiaries.96
However, the uniform version limits such trusts to a term of twenty-one years,
after which they are unenforceable.97 This can interfere with the long-term goals
of a settlor attempting to achieve a non-charitable purpose, such as maintaining a
private building without endangering the property by commingling it with a trust
that has identifiable beneficiaries.98 As a result, settlors have traditionally been
advised to locate such trusts in offshore jurisdictions.99
In recent years, however, some states, including Wyoming, have enacted the
UTC in a manner that allows for effective purpose trusts.100 Wyoming’s statute
eliminates the UTC language limiting the term of honorary trusts (solving the
perpetuities problem) and provides that they may be enforced by a trust advisor,
trust protector, or other appointee (solving the enforcement problem).101 Purpose

91

See Unif. Trust Code § 409 (2005).

Alexander A. Bove, Jr., Trusts Without Beneficiaries—Purpose Trusts For the Family Pets or the
Family Business, Tr. & Est., Aug. 2005 [hereinafter Trusts Without Beneficiaries], available at http://
www.bovelanga.com/new/publications/articles/Trusts_Without_Beneficiaries.pdf.
92

See Restatement (Second) of Trusts § 2 (1959); 2 Scott, Ascher & Fratcher, supra
note 8, § 12.1; J.B. Ames, The Failure of the Tilden Trust, 5 Harv. L. Rev. 389, 390 (1982).
93

94
Alexander A. Bove, Jr., The Purpose of Purpose Trusts, Prob. & Prop., May/June 2004, at
34. While attorneys general are typically authorized to sue to enforce a charitable trust, it would be
somewhat difficult for a dog or collection of automobiles to sue a trustee. Id.
95

See Trusts Without Beneficiaries, supra note 92.

Id.; Unif. Trust Code §§ 408 (“Trust for Care of Animal”), 409 (“Noncharitable Trust
without Ascertainable Beneficiary”).
96

97
See Unif. Trust Code § 409 cmt.; Trusts Without Beneficiaries, supra note 92. North
Carolina goes so far as to state that such trusts terminate after twenty-one years. N.C. Gen. Stat.
§ 36C-4-409(1) (2010).
98
Trusts Without Beneficiaries, supra note 92; see also Alexander A. Bove, Jr., The Purpose of
Purpose Trusts, 22 GPSolo 18, 18–19 (2005) (noting possible noncharitable purposes).
99

Trusts Without Beneficiaries, supra note 92.

100

Bove, supra note 94, at 35; see also Wyo. Stat. Ann. § 4-10-410(a) (2010).

101

Wyo. Stat. Ann. § 4-10-410(a)(i)–(ii).
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trust property may only be applied pursuant to the trust’s intended purpose unless
a court determines that the intended purpose can be accomplished without using
all available trust assets, the residue of which will be distributed to the settlor or his
or her successors.102 States authorizing purpose trusts for an unlimited duration
include Maine, New Hampshire, North Dakota, and Utah.103 Some states retain
the UTC time limitation but alter it in some fashion.104 All such trusts must meet
the other standard requirements for creating an express trust and the purpose
“must be certain, reasonable, and possible.”105

5. Prudent Investor Standard
The Prudent Investor standard governing the investment of trust assets was
adopted in 1994 to supplant the Prudent Man standard.106 This change came about
in response to a growing awareness that managing risk is more often undertaken
on a portfolio-wide basis rather than asset-by-asset. Most states, Wyoming among
them, have adopted the Uniform Prudent Investor Act, allowing trustees more
flexibility in the type of asset and overall style of management available when
overseeing trust funds.107

6. Migrating and Resettling Trusts
Clients choose to migrate or resettle a trust for any number of reasons.108
They may intend to take advantage of the laws of a more tax-friendly or asset102

Id. § 4-10-410(a)(iii).

See Me. Rev. Stat. tit. 18-B, § 409 (2010); N.H. Rev. Stat. Ann. § 564-B:4-409 (2010);
N.D. Cent. Code § 59-12-09 (2010); Utah Code Ann. § 75-7-409 (West 2010).
103

See Ariz. Rev. Stat. Ann. § 14-10409 (2010) (providing for a ninety year period); Or.
Rev. Stat. § 130.190(1) (2010) (same); S.C. Code Ann. § 62-7-409 (2010) (excluding cemetery
purpose trusts from the perpetuities period); Tenn. Code Ann. § 35-15-409 (2010) (providing for
a ninety year period).
104

105
Bove, supra note 94, at 36 (citing the infamous testamentary trusts of George Bernard
Shaw, one of which was dedicated to determining “the number of living persons who speak and
write English ‘at any and every moment in the world’”).

Unif. Prudent Investor Act 1994 §§ 1–16 (2006); Restatement (Third) of Trusts:
Prudent Investor Rule § 227 (1992). The Prudent Man standard requires that a trustee act “in
the same manner as a person of prudence, discretion, and judgment would in managing his or her
own affairs with the purpose of accomplishing objectives similar to those of the trustee, not for
speculation but for the permanent disposition of the trustee’s own funds.” Bogert et al., supra
note 16, § 612. Furthermore, the Prudent Man must evaluate each investment individually. Id. A
Prudent Investor, on the other hand, is allowed to act in the manner of a prudent investor, exercising
reasonable care, skill, and caution as part of an overall investment strategy applied to the whole trust
portfolio. Restatement (Third) of Trusts: Prudent Investor Rule § 227.
106

107
A list of states that have adopted the Uniform Prudent Investor Act can be accessed
through the NCCUSL website, available at http://www.nccusl.org/Update/uniformact_factsheets/
uniformacts-fs-upria.asp.

The term “migrate” is generally used when a trust is being moved from an offshore to an
onshore jurisdiction; “resettle” refers to a trust situs change from one U.S. jurisdiction to another,
sometimes implying that the trust is being reformed.
108
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protective jurisdiction; they may want to make trust administration duties easier
by locating their trust in the same state as an already-established family office;
or they may have simply changed locations themselves and want control of their
assets to follow.
Changing the situs of a trust to Wyoming, whether from an onshore or
offshore location, occurs automatically upon any Wyoming trustee accepting
trusteeship of the trust and some trust administration occurring in Wyoming.109
The relative ease of establishing a Wyoming private trust company allows for a
change of situs instantaneously in the event a client needs to avail itself of the
beneficial uses of the Wyoming UTC, including reformation.110 Furthermore, a
change of situs can be obtained without engaging a public trust company (which
can take months or longer) for those cases requiring an immediate change. In
the event a situs change encompasses a tax planning element, Wyoming’s district
courts are able to confirm the change of situs on a retroactive basis.111
More often than not, the goal of changing situs to Wyoming is permanent.
In some instances, however, it is sensible to migrate to Wyoming to take
advantage of the Wyoming UTC and then repatriate to the client’s home state
or country in the event the home state or country’s laws would not facilitate a
determination or reformation easily obtained in Wyoming. One can migrate a
trust to Wyoming and ask a court to reform it without mandating continuing
supervision by Wyoming courts.112 A court in a UTC jurisdiction will generally
limit its supervision to particular matters addressed to it and not subject the trust
to mandatory supervision, as some states require.113

7. Reformation and Decanting Ability
As settlors and beneficiaries are often surprised to learn, the terms of an
irrevocable trust are not necessarily set in stone. The ability to reform or modify
an outdated trust or simply change certain terms of a trust when they have become
untenable can be a useful tool. Even changes contrary to the stated purpose or
intent of the trust can often be made so long as the settlor and all beneficiaries
agree.114 With the adoption of the UTC, Wyoming and a number of other states

109

Wyo. Stat. Ann. §§ 4-10-108, -202 (2010).

See infra Part III.E.1 (discussing private trust companies); infra notes 114–20 and
accompanying text (discussing reformation).
110

111

Wyo. Stat. Ann. § 4-10-417.

See id. § 4-10-201(a) (“The court may intervene in the administration of a trust to the
extent its jurisdiction is invoked by an interested person or as provided by law.”); id. § 4-10-201(b)
(“A trust is not subject to continuing judicial supervision unless ordered by the court.”).
112

113

See Unif. Trust Code § 201(b) cmt. (2005).

114

See, e.g., Wyo. Stat. Ann. §§ 4-10-411 to -418.
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allow modification of a trust within certain parameters by court order.115 Several
states, such as South Dakota, have gone beyond the UTC in adopting more flexible
reformation and modification statutes.116 While South Dakota’s non-UTC statute
has a different structure, Wyoming provides the same reformation, termination,
and modification opportunities.117 The differences include Wyoming’s allowance
of retroactive modification to achieve a settlor’s tax objectives,118 South Dakota’s
lower threshold before allowing settlors to terminate uneconomic trusts,119 and
South Dakota’s prohibition of beneficiaries from asserting the doctrine of laches
in a modification, termination, or reformation proceeding.120
Likewise, the ability to transfer assets of an existing trust to a newly created
trust, often called decanting, may achieve the same or additional goals. To this
end, a number of states have adopted decanting statutes, including Alaska,
Delaware, Nevada, New Hampshire, and South Dakota.121 Some commentators
argue that these statutes merely codify the already extant common law ability
of a trustee to decant.122 This common law doctrine is based on two principals:
first, a trustee with absolute power to invade a trust corpus holds a limited
power of appointment; and second, the trustee, as holder of a limited power
of appointment, may use that power to create an estate that is less than that
specified in the governing instrument, so long as the governing instrument does
not reflect a contrary intent.123 While the differing stances taken by the various
Restatements of Property have clouded the issue, courts have accepted that a
trustee’s discretionary power is the equivalent of a power of appointment, thereby
supporting the first principle of the argument.124
See, e.g., id. A summary of which states have adopted portions of the UTC can be accessed
through the NCCUSL website, available at http://www.nccusl.org/Update/.
115

116
See, e.g., S.D. Codified Laws §§ 55-3-23 to -30 (2010) (providing for trust modification,
termination, and reformation).
117

See Wyo. Stat. Ann. §§ 4-10-411 to -418.

118

Id. § 4-10-417.

See S.D. Codified Laws § 55-3-27 (worth less than $50,000); Wyo. Stat. Ann. § 4-10-415
(worth less than $150,000).
119

120

S.D. Codified Laws § 55-3-29.1.

Alaska Stat. § 13.36.157 (2010); Del. Code Ann. tit. 12, § 3528 (2010); Nev. Rev. Stat.
§ 163.556 (2010); N.H. Rev. Stat. Ann. § 564-B:4-418 (2010); S.D. Codified Laws § 55-2-15.
121

William R. Burford & Patricia H. Char, Renegotiating the Irrevocable Trust: Amending,
Decanting, and Judicially Modifying, SP035 A.L.I.-A.B.A. 325, 333 (2009).
122

Alan Halperin & Michelle R. Wandler, Decanting Discretionary Trusts: State Law and Tax
Considerations, Est., Gifts, & Tr. J., Sept. 2004, at 219; see Jonathan G. Blattmachr & Diana S. C.
Zeydel, Tax Effects of Decanting—Obtaining and Preserving the Benefits, J. Tax’n, Nov. 2009, at 288,
289; William R. Culp, Jr. & Briani Bennet Mellen, Trust Decanting: An Overview and Introduction
to Creative Planning Opportunities, 45 Real Prop., Tr. & Est. L.J. 1, 4 (2010); supra notes 55–63
and accompanying text (discussing powers of appointment).
123

The Restatement (First) of Property states that a fiduciary power is not a power of
appointment. § 318(2) (1936). This position is also supported by the Restatement (Third) of
Trusts. §§ 50 cmt. a, 84 cmt. d (2008) (distinguishing between a fiduciary power, which runs with
124
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Regarding the second principle of a trustee’s ability to decant, it is a general rule
that a person with a power of appointment has broad discretion in deciding how
to exercise that power.125 If a trustee distributing assets outright to beneficiaries is
exercising a power of appointment, common law provides the trustee also has the
power to distribute the assets in a lesser estate.126 This broad power is only limited
by the contrary intention of a donor as evidenced by the governing instrument.127
Therefore, if a situation exists in Wyoming in which reforming or modifying
a trust does not achieve the results that decanting it would, the common law
decanting doctrine supported by the Restatement (Second) of Property and
caselaw suggests that a trustee of a trust under Wyoming law is able to decant the
trust for the benefit of the beneficiaries.

8. Virtual Representative Statutes
While the common law doctrine of virtual representation has been in existence
for some time, a number of states have statutorily expanded the doctrine’s coverage
to new applications.128 The doctrine has been described as one that “permits a party
having a substantially identical interest and no conflict of interest on a particular
question or dispute to represent and legally bind a minor, disabled person or
unborn party, or other beneficiaries with contingent interests.”129 Therefore, these
the office of a trustee, and a power of appointment, which is personal to the power holder). The
Restatement (Second) of Property characterizes a power of appointment as an “authority, other than
as an incident of the beneficial ownership of property, to designate recipients of beneficial interests
in property.” § 11.1 (1986). And finally, the as-yet-tentative draft of the Restatement (Third) of
Property appears to return to the position of the First Restatement. § 17.1 cmt. g (Tentative Draft
No. 5, 2006).
See Phipps v. Palm Beach Trust Co., 196 So. 299, 301 (Fla. 1940); In re Spencer’s Estate, 232
N.W.2d 491, 496–98 (Iowa 1975); Wiedenmayer v. Johnson, 106 N.J. Super. 161, 164–65 (App.
Div. 1969). No case law in Wyoming discusses decanting. However, in Garwood v. Garwood, 194
P.3d 319, 327 (Wyo. 2008), the Wyoming Supreme Court recognized the broad discretion of the
court to modify trusts under the common law, the Uniform Trust Code, or the equitable powers of
the court. If the common law can be used to modify a trust, it is arguable that it may also be used
to decant a trust.
125
Restatement (Second) of Prop.: Donative Transfers § 12.2 (1986) (“The scope of the
donee’s authority as to appointees and the time and manner of appointment is unlimited except to
the extent the donor effectively manifests an intent to impose limits.”).

Covey & Hastings, supra note 63, ¶ 101.3[B] (citing Phipps, 196 So. at 301) (“[T]he power
to appoint outright to permissible appointees includes the power to appoint in further trust for
them.”); see 1 Scott, Ascher & Fratcher, supra note 8, § 3.1.2; Blattmachr & Zeydel, supra note
123, at 289.
126

127
Blattmachr & Zeydel, supra note 123, at 289; Restatement (Second) of Prop.: Donative
Transfers § 12.2; Restatement (Third) of Prop.: Wills and Other Donative Transfers § 19.14
(Tentative Draft No. 5, 2006).
128
See Susan T. Bart & Lyman W. Welch, State Statutes on Virtual Representation—A New State
Survey, 35 Am. C. Tr. & Est. Couns. J. 368 (2010) (providing an analysis of each state’s virtual
representation statutes).
129

Id. at 368.
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statutes clarify trust administration issues when there are contingent, unborn,
or unascertainable beneficiaries by delineating who must be served in a judicial
proceeding or who must be present in a nonjudicial matter in order to bind
beneficiaries with similar interests, including those who are unascertainable.130
The theory behind this doctrine is that a person representing his own interests
as well as the substantially similar interests of unascertainable persons will, by
protecting his own interests, adequately protect those of the represented parties;
it is therefore in the interests of administrative ease and judicial economy to allow
such virtual representation.131
While the UTC has incorporated virtual representation provisions, some
jurisdictions, including Wyoming, have expanded upon the UTC, while states
such as South Dakota have adopted provisions not based upon the UTC at
all.132 For example, states like Wyoming allow any matter involving a trust to be
resolved by nonjudicial settlement agreements in which virtual representation is
acknowledged.133 South Dakota, however, does not appear to have a nonjudicial
settlement statute except with regard to trustee accounting.134 As a result, in South
Dakota most trust administration matters involving virtual representation must
be adjudicated judicially. States that have adopted enhanced virtual representation
statutes include Alaska, Delaware, Nevada, South Dakota, and Wyoming.135

E. Private Family Trust Companies
Privately-owned, family-operated trust companies have been a part of the
landscape of preserving wealth for quite some time.136 Long assumed to be the
purview of those attempting to secure a net worth of at least $200 million,
changes in the laws of a number of jurisdictions, including Wyoming, have placed
private family trust companies within the reach of clients with far less at stake.137
Such companies help a family guard its wealth by taking its assets out of the
federal transfer tax regime and, just as importantly, allow family members to take

130

At least forty-two states have expanded the common law doctrine of virtual representation.

See id.
Martin D. Begleiter, Serve the Cheerleader—Serve the World: An Analysis of Representation
in Estate and Trust Proceedings and Under the Uniform Trust Code and Other Modern Trust Codes, 43
Real Prop. Tr., & Est. L.J. 311, 318–19 (2008).
131

132

Id.

133

Unif. Trust Code § 111 (2000); Wyo. Stat. Ann. § 4-10-111 (2010).

134

S.D. Codified Laws § 55-3-45 (2010).

Alaska Stat. § 13.06.120 (2010); Del. Code Ann. tit. 12, § 3547 (2010); Nev. Rev. Stat.
§ 155.140 (2010); N.H. Rev. Stat. Ann. § 564-B:3-304 (2010); S.D. Codified Laws §§ 55-3-31
to -38; Wyo. Stat. Ann. § 4-10-304.
135

136

Goodwin, supra note 3, at 467–68.

137

Id.
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charge of their own investments, shouldering as much or as little risk as makes
them comfortable.138
Usually structured as a corporation or LLC, a private family trust company
provides the sort of services generally offered by an individual or institutional
trustee and operates under the guidance of a board of directors often comprised
of family members and trusted advisors. As a result, the individuals most familiar
with the family itself make trust distribution and investment decisions. This
structure also allows for what is often called “financial parenting” by providing
opportunities to integrate future generations into the active management of the
family’s ongoing affairs.139
Private family trust companies stretch the envelope of flexibility in trust
administration in a number of additional ways as well. A private family trust
company is able and often better equipped to hold the sort of illiquid family
assets that institutional trustees are often unwilling to oversee—family-owned
businesses, for example.140 Such consolidation often results in less fragmentation
and overall coordination in asset management and protection. The formation of a
private family trust company also solves the trustee successor problem because the
company remains the trustee for the life of the trust, regardless of the individuals
on the board. Positions on the board are filled or changed as needed, negating
continual amendments to underlying trust instruments, fees associated with
changing trustees, and offering added flexibility.

1. State Regulation
Originally, states required private family trust companies to be chartered and
regulated in the same way as any trust company serving the public.141 In a number
of states, new laws now allow families to create unregulated or lightly-regulated
trust companies with the requirement that the company serve only as trustee
of a trust that benefits related people. Among the top-rated trust states, Alaska
and South Dakota allow only lightly-regulated private family trust companies
as does Delaware.142 Only Wyoming and Nevada allow both regulated and
unregulated entities.143

138

Id. at 487–511.

139

Id. at 469–70 (discussing the positive aspects of “financial parenting”).

Large banks and other financial institutions are often reluctant to deal with real estate,
operating companies, family businesses, etc. See id. at 479 n.55.
140

141

Id. at 472–73.

Alaska Stat. § 06.26.200 (2010); Del. Code Ann. tit. 5, §§ 773–779 (2010); S.D.
Codified Laws § 51A-6A-4 (2010); see also Goodwin, supra note 3, at 473 n.21.
142

143

Wyo. Stat. Ann. §§ 13-5-101 to -104 (2010); Nev. Rev. Stat. § 669.080(1)(o) (2010).
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Wyoming law allows for the creation of unregulated private trust companies.144
According to an opinion letter issued from the Wyoming Attorney General to the
State Banking Commissioner, a company that does not provide trust business
to the general public cannot be subject to mandatory regulation as a “trust
company.”145 The legislature has defined “trust business” as holding forth to the
public that one will act as a trustee and performing such duties in the ordinary
course of business.146 While the legislature removed statutory language explicitly
exempting trust companies that do not engage in trust business with the general
public, that revision was not intended to have a substantive effect.147 “[U]nless
a corporation exercising trust responsibilities engages in trust operations for the
general public . . . the State of Wyoming through the Banking Commissioner does
not have any powers to regulate the same.”148 Accordingly, any company that
does not exercise the trust responsibilities specified in Wyoming Statute section
13-5-101(b) for the public at large will not be engaging in “trust business” and is
not subject to regulation as a trust company.149
In 2009, in a bid to make its trust laws more competitive, the Nevada
legislature exempted trust companies meeting the requirements of a “family
trust company” from regulation.150 Nevada family trust companies must not
“(1) Transact trust company business with; (2) Propose to act as a fiduciary for; or
(3) Solicit trust company business from, a person who is not a family member.”151
Nevada requires that unregulated trust companies do business with members of a
single family.152 In contrast, Wyoming provides more flexibility by only requiring
144
Wyo. Stat. Ann. §§ 13-5-101 to -104. Wyoming Statute section 13-5-101(f ) states,
“Except as provided in this section no person shall act as a trust company or engage in the trust
business without first obtaining a charter from the commissioner under this chapter.” The language
of this statute requires any person, including a corporation, to obtain a charter from the Banking
Commissioner if such person: (1) is a “trust company,” or (2) engages in “trust business.” Wyoming
Statute section 13-1-101(xv) defines the term “trust business” as:

[T]he holding out by a person to the public at large by advertising, solicitation or
other means that such person is available to act as an executor, administrator, guardian,
conservator or trustee in this state and accepting and undertaking to perform the
duties in such a capacity in the regular course of his business.
Letter from Joseph B. Meyer, Wyo. Attorney Gen., to Sue Mecca, State Banking Comm’r,
Wyo. Banking Comm’n (Mar. 1, 1993) [hereinafter Att’y Gen. Op.] (on file with author).
145

146

Wyo. Stat. Ann. § 13-1-101(xv).

147

Att’y Gen. Op., supra note 145.

148

Id. (emphasis added).

149

Id.

S.B. 365, 75th Leg., Reg. Sess. (Nev. 2009); see Nev. Rev. Stat. § 669.080(1)(o) (2010)
(“This chapter does not apply to a person who . . . [a]cts as a family trust company . . . . A family
trust company which is not licensed under the provisions of this chapter shall be deemed not to have
engaged in trust company business . . . .”); id. § 669A.100 (exempting family trust companies from
licensing requirements).
150

151

Nev. Rev. Stat. § 669.042; accord id. § 669A.080(3).

152

Id. § 669.042.
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that a private trust company not hold itself forth to the public as providing trust
services.153 Nevada also has a much higher state insurance premium tax than
Wyoming154 and does not provide equivalent protection to LLCs and Family
Limited Partnerships (FLPs).155
An unregulated private family trust company is exempt from the regulation
normally required of an entity formed to offer trustee services to the public at
large. Such companies tend to be quick and inexpensive to establish precisely
because there are no reporting requirements, attendant formalities, or minimum
capital investment. Due to zero state oversight, such companies are less expensive
to operate than their regulated counterparts. Additionally, the absence of licensing
requirements allows an unregulated private trust company to make changes to its
board members, officers, and some structural provisions without the hassle and
expense associated with changing institutional trustees.
A regulated private family trust company, on the other hand, requires an
initial capital investment, annual state audits, policy and procedure manuals,
and compliance with other regulatory requirements.156 Such companies are often
subject to state supervision regulating the number of directors (generally requiring
a resident director), the number of board meetings per year, the existence of a
physical office in the state, and the number of employees. Furthermore, in
some states, including South Dakota, a surety bond is required.157 As a result, a
regulated private family trust company is more costly and time-intensive to set up
and administer.
153

See supra notes 144–49 and accompanying text.

154

See supra notes 71–72 and accompanying text.

See infra Part III.F.3. Nevada FLPs formed after 2007 that have not opted to be governed
by the old version of the Uniform Limited Partnership Act (ULPA) can be subject to foreclosure
by a creditor with a charging order. Mark Merric & William Comer, Forum Shopping for Favorable
FLP and LLC Legislation—Part I, Steve Leimberg’s Asset Protection Plan. Email Newsl.,
no. 112 (Aug. 2007) [hereinafter Merric & Comer, No. 112], available at http://www.hro.com/
files/file/publications/Merric/Asset_Protection_Planning/Charging_Order/chargingorder5.pdf; see
also Nev. Rev. Stat. § 87A.480 (allowing foreclosure of a charged interest in a limited partnership
governed by the new version of ULPA).
155

While Nevada specifies that the charging order is the sole remedy of a creditor against
a member’s LLC interest, its statute is silent as to the availability of broad charging orders that
may restrict LLC activities and equitable remedies, such as reverse veil-piercing. Mark Merric &
William Comer, Forum Shopping for Favorable FLP and LLC Legislation—Part VI, Steve Leimberg’s
Asset Protection Plan. Email Newsl., no. 154 (May 2010) [hereinafter Merric & Comer, No.
154], available at http://www.hro.com/files/file/publications/Merric/Asset_Protection_Planning/
Charging_Order/LLCChargingOrderTable.pdf. Wyoming expressly prohibits broad charging
orders. Wyo. Stat. Ann. § 17-29-503(g) (2010). Its newly enacted LLC statute also prevents the
use of equitable remedies, such as reverse veil-piercing. Id.; Cottam et al., supra note 77, at 81.
156
See Del. Code Ann. tit. 5, § 771 (2010) ($1,000,000); S.D. Codified Laws § 51A-6A-19
(2010) ($200,000); Wyo. Stat. Ann. § 13-5-105 ($500,000).
157

See, e.g., S.D. Codified Laws § 51A-6A-19 (requiring a surety bond of $1 million).

Published by Law Archive of Wyoming Scholarship, 2011

25

Wyoming Law Review, Vol. 11 [2011], No. 1, Art. 6

190

Wyoming Law Review

Vol. 11

One argument often made by proponents of regulated trust companies hinges
on liability—if the corporate veil of an unregulated entity is pierced, the members
of the family who are the members of the LLC potentially become personally
liable.158 This argument is not particularly persuasive for several reasons. First,
as one commentator notes, “by virtue of the family component of these trusts,
the beneficiaries suing for breach of trust will be the children, siblings, cousins,
nieces, and nephews of those serving in a decision-making capacity in the
trust.”159 And second, when creating an unregulated private family trust company,
most attorneys will advise their clients to create and employ basic organizational
documents such as bylaws, meeting minutes, and a structured decision-making
process. Finally, Wyoming’s newly revised LLC statute minimizes the risk of
reverse-veil piercing.160 As a result, unregulated companies are not at substantially
greater risk of liability than their regulated cousins.
A Wyoming private family trust company can be wholly exempt from the
regulation normally required of an entity formed to offer trustee services to the
public at large; however, if a family’s needs are better met by the formation of a
regulated entity, Wyoming allows for chartered, and therefore regulated, private
family trust companies as well.161 Most families establishing private family trust
companies in Wyoming opt for the unregulated version because it is cost effective,
easy to set up and administer, requires little year-to-year reporting, and provides
the greatest flexibility in terms of family control and structure. Wyoming’s
corporate law allows both unregulated and regulated private trust companies to
be structured so as to completely shield family names, assets, and other relevant
details from the public.162 As one of only a few top-rated trust situs states that
allow for the formation of unregulated as well as regulated private family trust
companies, both of which provide a high degree of protection and privacy,
Wyoming offers clients the ultimate in choice when creating a private family
trust company.

2. Federal Regulation and the Dodd-Frank Act
The Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC) considers many trustees
to be investment advisers within the meaning of the Investment Advisers Act of
1940 (IAA).163 Such trustees must register with the SEC as investment advisers
158

See Goodwin, supra note 3, at 477–78.

159

Id. at 478 n.49.

160

See Wyo. Stat. Ann. § 17-29-503(g); Cottam et al., supra note 77, at 81.

Although there are no formal regulations on the matter, the Wyoming Division of Banking
has allowed a family to form a chartered trust company with the restriction that it not offer trustee
services to the public at large.
161

162

See supra notes 75–81 and accompanying text.

See Joseph Nameth, SEC No-Action Letter, 1983 WL 30256 (Jan. 31, 1983) (applying the
IAA to private trusts). The SEC’s position appears to be that a trustee with discretionary power to
buy and sell securities for a trust is an investment adviser within the meaning of the IAA where the
163
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unless an exemption to registration applies. Most trustees of private family trust
companies have relied on the private adviser exemption to avoid registration
under the IAA.164 Further, the SEC has a long tradition of issuing exemptive
orders to family offices pursuant to its authority to rule that an office falls within
the definition of an investment adviser but is “not within the intent” of that
definition.165 Not only were such companies not required to register, they did not
have to comply with any of the other regulations imposed on investment advisers
by the IAA.166
The recently-enacted Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer
Protection Act (Dodd-Frank Act) eliminates this exemption, effective July of
2011.167 To avoid forcing private family trust companies to register, the DoddFrank Act creates a new exemption from registration under the IAA for any
“family office.”168 Further, the Dodd-Frank Act directs the SEC to promulgate
rules defining the term family office in a way that is consistent with previous
exemptive orders issued by the SEC and recognizes the range of organizational,
management, and employment structures employed by family offices.169
On October 12, 2010, the SEC proposed new rules defining the family office
exemption and called for public comments to be submitted before November 18,
2010.170 According to the proposed rule, the IAA does not define a family office as

trustee undertakes such activities for compensation. Id. The SEC has adopted a broad definition
of compensation and has stated that a trustee accepting fees for administering trust(s) constitutes
compensation for investment advice. Id.
The former private investor exemption applied to advisers who (i) have had fewer than
fifteen clients in the past twelve months, (ii) do not hold themselves out generally to the public as
investment advisers, and (iii) do not act as an investment adviser to a registered investment company
or business development company. See 15 U.S.C. § 80b-3(b)(3) (2006).
164

165
Family Offices, 75 Fed. Reg. 63,753, 63,754 (Oct. 18, 2010) (citing 15 U.S.C. § 80b-2(a)
(11)(G)) (to be codified at 17 C.F.R. § 275.202(a)(11)(G)-1).
166

Id. at 63,754–63,755.

Pub. L. No. 111-203, 124 Stat. 1367 (2010). The Dodd-Frank Act, signed into law on July
21, 2010, sets forth several amendments to the IAA, as amended. Id. § 403 (to be codified at 15
U.S.C. § 80b-3). Under the Act, many unregistered investment advisers will be required to register
for the first time with either the SEC or with state securities regulators. The purpose of removing the
exemption was to force private fund advisers (such as hedge funds) to register with the SEC. Family
Offices, 75 Fed. Reg. 63,753, 63,756 (Oct. 18, 2010) (to be codified at 17 C.F.R. § 275.202(a)(11)
(G)-1).
167

168

§ 409 (to be codified in 15 U.S.C. § 80b-2(a)(11)).

169

Id.

Family Offices, 75 Fed. Reg. 63,753, 63,754 (Oct. 18, 2010) (to be codified at 17 C.F.R.
§ 275.202(a)(11)(G)-1).
170
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an investment adviser.171 The rule defines a family office as a company (including
its employees, directors, trustees, etc.) that
(1) Has no clients other than family clients; provided that if a person
that is not a family client becomes a client of the family office as a
result of the death of a family member or key employee or other
involuntary transfer from a family member or key employee,
that person shall be deemed to be a family client for purposes of
this section . . . for four months following the transfer of assets
resulting from the involuntary event;
(2) Is wholly owned and controlled (directly or indirectly) by family
members; and
(3) Does not hold itself out to the public as an investment adviser.172
In proposing these requirements, the SEC sought to distill the principles
developed over several decades of granting exemptive orders to specific family
trust companies into a general rule.173 Notable provisions of the proposed rule
include the inclusion of non-traditional individuals as family members,174 the
non-exemption of family offices that serve or are owned or operated by more than
one family,175 the requirement that family offices not hold themselves forth to the
public as investment advisers,176 and the proposal that the SEC not rescind any
of its prior exemptive rulings.177 Until the SEC issues the final rules defining the
term family office, it will remain difficult to determine whether the exemption
will be available to individual trustees. However, it is likely that some trustees of
private family trust companies will fall within the new exemption.
The Dodd-Frank Act requires the SEC to grandfather certain persons into
the definition of family office.178 Such persons must have not been registered
or required to be registered under the IAA on January 1, 2010, solely because
171

Id.

172

Id. at 63,762.

173

Id. at 63,755.

The proposed rules define adopted children, stepchildren, spousal equivalents, key
employees, and the founders’ parents, siblings, and the issue thereof as family members. Id. at
63,763.
174

Id. at 63,762. The SEC seeks to distinguish between family offices and family-run offices.
Id. at 63,759. It argues that families can protect their own interests within the family or through
state litigation in ways that outsiders cannot. Id. at 63,754.
175

176
Id. at 63,759. The SEC argues that holding a company out to the public as an investment
adviser contradicts the policy rationale for not requiring family offices to register. Id.

Id. The SEC argues that the rule should allow family offices to rely on prior rulings because
(1) the policy of the proposed rule does not differ substantially from past exemptive rulings, and
(2) family offices do not compete with each other, eliminating the need to level the playing field. Id.
177

178
Pub. L. No. 111-203, § 409, 124 Stat. 1367, 1575–76 (2010) (to be codified at 15 U.S.C.
§ 80b-2(b)(3)).
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they provided investment advice to one of three categories of clients specified in
the Dodd-Frank Act.179 The SEC has acknowledged that it is prohibited from
not grandfathering such individuals and has incorporated the grandfathering
provision into its proposed rule.180

F. Asset Protection
Asset protection planning is premised on the same basic notions of wealth
preservation that compel most clients to seek estate planning counsel in the first
place. Planners often take an approach involving the creation of a number of
sheltered entities such as limited partnerships, LLCs, corporations, life insurance
policies, and various trusts, all formed for the purpose of tax planning and wealth
transfer but having the additional effect of protecting assets from creditors.181
While offshore asset protection trusts have long existed, twelve U.S. jurisdictions
have adopted domestic asset protection trust (DAPT) legislation, making asset
protection a reality onshore.182
A certain degree of tension exists with regard to the rights of an individual to
protect his or her assets versus the rights of creditors to recover monies they are
owed.183 While guarding against fraud in this sector of trust creation is important,
the fact remains that the vast majority of clients who hire an advisor to help with
estate planning have no thoughts of defrauding present or future creditors. That
being said, a prudent planner does not discount this potentially important aspect
when assessing a client’s needs in terms of type of trust and situs selection.

179

Id. Specified clients include
(A) natural persons who, at the time of their applicable investment, are officers,
directors, or employees of the family office who—
(i) have invested with the family office before January 1, 2010; and
(ii) are accredited investors . . . ;
(B) any company owned exclusively and controlled by members of the family
of the family office, or as the Commission may prescribe by rule;
(C) any investment adviser registered under the Investment Adviser Act of 1940
that provides investment advice to the family office and who identifies investment
opportunities to the family office, and invests in such transactions on substantially the
same terms as the family office invests, but does not invest in other funds advised by
the family office, and whose assets as to which the family office directly or indirectly
provides investment advice represent, in the aggregate, not more than 5 percent of the
value of the total assets as to which the family office provides investment advice.

Id.
180

Family Offices, 75 Fed. Reg. 63,753, 63,759 (Oct. 18, 2010).

181

See Osborne & Osborne, supra note 3, at 215–16.

182

See supra Part II (discussing offshore trust jurisdictions).

See Robert T. Danforth, Rethinking the Law of Creditors’ Rights in Trusts, 53 Hastings L.J.
287, 289 (2002); Osborne & Osborne, supra note 3, at 209–10.
183
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Asset protection legislation varies widely from state to state.184 Wyoming’s
laws are advantageous in several respects. First, Wyoming is one of only a few
highly-ranked jurisdictions allowing self-settled spendthrift trusts by statute.185
Second, Wyoming laws provide protection for discretionary as well as mandatory
distributions in self-settled and third party trusts.186 Third, Wyoming statutes give
clear definitional guidance regarding discretionary trusts and, absent an abuse
of discretion, prevent creditors from compelling discretionary distributions.187
Finally, Wyoming has sole remedy charging order protection for LLCs and Family
Limited Partnerships (FLPs).188

1. Self-Settled Trust Legislation
A self-settled trust is generally an irrevocable trust organized in such a way
that the settlor is also a discretionary beneficiary. A spendthrift trust gives the
trustee full authority to decide when and how assets are distributed as long as
they are for the benefit of the beneficiary and protect assets against attachment by
creditors (minus a few statutory exceptions).189 Combined with the advantages of
spendthrift protection, self-settled trusts are fairly powerful when it comes to asset
protection. The majority of states and the UTC do not allow spendthrift trusts to
be self-settled, or rather they do not protect a beneficiary to the extent that such a
beneficiary is also the person who settled the assets in the trust.190
In 2007, Wyoming amended the Wyoming Uniform Trust Code to allow for
the creation of self-settled spendthrift trusts.191 A self-settled qualified spendthrift
trust in Wyoming allows the settlor to receive: (1) income from the trust;
(2) distributions from a charitable remainder annuity trust or unitrust; (3) annual
distributions of up to five percent of the initial value of the trust; (4) distributions
of principal at the trustee’s sole discretion or based on an ascertainable standard;
See Shaftel, supra note 3 (including a state-by-state assessment of DAPT legislation); see also
Osborne & Osborne, supra note 3, at 230–45.
184

185

Wyo. Stat. Ann. § 4-10-510 (2010); see infra Part III.F.1 (discussing self-settled trusts).

Wyo. Stat. Ann. § 4-10-508. This statute provides that a creditor cannot reach a mandatory
distribution until it is received by the beneficiary. South Dakota has also taken this approach which
follows the Restatement (Second) of Trusts view. See infra Part III.F.2 (discussing protection of
various distribution interests).
186

Wyo. Stat. Ann. §§ 4-10-103, -504; see infra notes 205–08 and accompanying text
(discussing protection from compelled distributions).
187

188
Wyo. Stat. Ann. § 17-29-503(g); see infra Part III.F.3 (discussing family limited
partnerships and limited liability companies).
189
The exceptions vary by state but often include exceptions for claims of child support,
alimony, division of assets in divorce proceedings, and sometimes tort creditor claims.
190

See, e.g., Unif. Trust Code art. 5 (2005).

Wyo. Stat. Ann. §§ 4-10-501 to -523. Alaska, Delaware, Hawaii, Missouri, Nevada, New
Hampshire, Oklahoma, Rhode Island, South Dakota, Tennessee, and Utah also have statutes that
protect self-settled discretionary trusts from creditors.
191
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and (5) the use of real property held in a qualified personal residence trust.192
Without affecting the trust’s spendthrift protection, the settlor is statutorily
allowed to retain a number of powers including: (1) the power to veto distributions;
(2) an inter vivos or testamentary general or limited power of appointment;
(3) the right to add, remove, or replace a trustee, a trust advisor, or a trust protector
with a person other than the settlor; and (4) the right to act as an investment
advisor to the trust.193 Of the top trust situs jurisdictions, Wyoming’s statutes are
the broadest with respect to the powers a settlor may retain.194
One of the requirements for creating a Wyoming qualified spendthrift trust
is that the instrument must state the laws of the state will govern the validity,
construction, and administration of the trust.195 However, if a court declines to
apply the law of Wyoming, a trustee has the right to resign, at which point the
court will appoint a successor trustee.196 Wyoming protects not only the trustee,
trust protector, and trust advisor, but also “any person involved in the counseling,
drafting, administration, preparation, execution or funding of the trust” against
any claims or causes of action by a settlor’s creditor.197 Additionally, Wyoming law
requires a settlor to sign a sworn affidavit stating he is not attempting to defraud
creditors, the transfer will not result in the settlor’s insolvency, he is not considering
filing for bankruptcy, and he has personal liability insurance of $1,000,000 or an
amount equal to the value of all property transferred to the trusts, whichever
is less.198

2. Types of Distribution Interests Protected
Both discretionary and mandatory distribution interests are potentially
implicated in asset protection statutes. In discretionary trusts, a trustee has the
power to make distributions to beneficiaries or to make no distributions at all. As
Id. § 4-10-510. These allowances are equivalent to the most generous statutory allowances
of other top trust situs jurisdictions. See Alaska Stat. § 34.40.110 (2010); Del. Code Ann. tit.
12, §§ 3570–3576 (2010); Nev. Rev. Stat. §§ 166.010 to .170 (2010); N.H. Rev. Stat. Ann.
§ 564-D:1-18 (2010); S.D. Codified Laws §§ 55-16-1 to -17 (2010).
192

193

Wyo. Stat. Ann. § 4-10-510.

Alaska, Delaware, Nevada, New Hampshire, and South Dakota all allow a settlor the power
to veto distributions. None of these states allow the settlor more than a non-general power of
appointment. The aforementioned states vary regarding the settlor’s power to replace trustees, trust
advisors, or trust protectors. Only South Dakota and Alaska (with the caveat that the settlor does
not have trustee power over discretionary distributions) join Wyoming in allowing a settlor to act as
a trust advisor. See Alaska Stat. § 34.40.110; Del. Code Ann. tit. 12, §§ 3570–3576; Nev. Rev.
Stat. §§ 166.010 to .170; N.H. Rev. Stat. Ann. § 564-D:1-18; S.D. Codified Laws §§ 55-16-1
to -17.
194

195

Wyo. Stat. Ann. § 4-10-510(a)(ii).

196

Id. § 4-10-522.

197

Id. § 4-10-517.

198

Id. §§ 4-10-512(b), -523.
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a result, because a beneficiary does not have a right to distributions, it is generally
argued the beneficiary therefore does not have a property interest in the trust.199 It
follows that a creditor may not stand in the debtor-beneficiary’s shoes and attach
trust distributions, thus providing creditor protection either separate from or in
addition to that imparted under a spendthrift trust.200
Wyoming laws provide protection for discretionary distributions.201 Alaska,
Delaware, Nevada, and South Dakota provide similar protection.202 Furthermore,
Wyoming clearly defines the term “discretionary” and “discretionary trust,”
making it clear to which trusts certain protections apply.203 South Dakota is the
only other top trust jurisdiction with a clear definition of “discretionary.”204
Mandatory trusts, as opposed to discretionary trusts, give no power to the
trustee regarding whether or not a distribution is made, rather the trustee must
make the disbursement required by the terms of the trust instrument. While a
mandatory distribution is arguably a property interest and therefore attachable,
Wyoming’s statutes clearly articulate a creditor has no rights over mandatory
distributions until they reach the beneficiary.205 As a result, a creditor cannot
compel a trustee to make a mandatory distribution.206 As long as a trustee fails to
make mandatory distributions, the creditor is thwarted.207 Additionally, a creditor
cannot bring an action against a trustee for an abuse of fiduciary duty because the
trustee has failed to make mandatory distributions or compel a beneficiary to bring
such an action.208 Finally, Wyoming protects both mandatory and discretionary
distributions even if the beneficiary is a trustee or cotrustee.209

199

Worthington & Merric, supra note 3, at 59.

Id. Wyoming, unlike several other jurisdictions including South Dakota and Missouri, does
not statutorily define whether being classified as a discretionary trust results in an expectancy right
or an enforceable property right. While established precedent holds that a discretionary interest is
a mere expectancy interest, language in Wyoming’s trust code to such effect would strengthen this
aspect of the law. See id. at 61.
200

201

Wyo. Stat. Ann. § 4-10-504(b).

See Alaska Stat. § 34.40.110(n)(1) (2010); Del. Code Ann. tit. 12, § 3536 (2010); Nev.
Rev. Stat. § 21.090(1)(cc)(3) (2010); S.D. Codified Laws § 55-1-43 (2010).
202

203

Wyo. Stat. Ann. §§ 4-10-103, -504.

204

S.D. Codified Laws § 55-1-38.

205

Wyo. Stat. Ann. § 4-10-508.

206

Id. § 4-10-504.

207

Id.

Id. This section does not limit the right of a beneficiary to maintain a court proceeding
against a trustee for an abuse of fiduciary duty. Id.
208

209

Id. § 4-10-505(b).

https://scholarship.law.uwyo.edu/wlr/vol11/iss1/6

32

Reimer: The Undiscovered Country: Wyoming's Emergence as a Leading Trust

2011

Wyoming as a Trust Situs

197

Most spendthrift statutes include exceptions for certain creditors and in
certain situations. In all jurisdictions, if a creditor can prove that a settlor created a
spendthrift trust in order to defraud his or her creditors, the spendthrift protection
is nullified and distributions can be attached.210 Such actions are generally governed
by the Uniform Fraudulent Transfers Act as adopted by the jurisdiction.211 Other
spendthrift exception creditors often include those owed child support, alimony,
or a claim for division of property pursuant to a divorce. Nevada does not
allow an exception for any of these creditors. Wyoming provides an exception
in favor of the settlor’s children for child support or maintenance.212 Wyoming
also excepts trust property listed upon an application or financial statement used
to obtain credit other than for the benefit of the trust or property transferred
to the trust which was obtained by a fraudulent transfer.213 Delaware, New
Hampshire, and South Dakota all provide exceptions for child support, alimony,
and property division upon divorce.214 Delaware and South Dakota except certain
tort creditors.215 Therefore, absent one of the fairly few spendthrift exceptions
available in Wyoming, the state protects both mandatory and discretionary trust
distributions from creditors.

3. Family Limited Partnerships and Limited Liability Companies
Charging Order Provisions
Charging order statutes protect certain state-recognized entities, FLPs and
LLCs, from all types of judicial remedies except that of the charging order.216
210

See, e.g., id. § 4-10-514.

211

See, e.g., id. §§ 34-14-201 to -212.

212

Id. §§ 4-10-503, -520.

213

Id. § 4-10-520(a)(ii).

Del. Code Ann. tit. 12, § 3573 (2010); N.H. Rev. Stat. Ann. § 564-B:5-503 (2010);
S.D. Codified Laws § 55-16-15 (2010).
214

215

Del. Code Ann. tit. 12, § 3573; S.D. Codified Laws § 55-16-15.

See David M. Grant & Jeremy K. Cooper, Nevada Laws Provide Top Trust Situs, Nev.
Law., May 2010, at 20, 25; Merric & Comer, No. 112, supra note 155; Merric & Comer, No.
154, supra note 155; Mark Merric & William Comer, Forum Shopping for Favorable FLP and LLC
Legislation—Part II, Steve Leimberg’s Asset Protection Plan. Email Newsl., no. 114 (Aug. 2007)
[hereinafter Merric & Comer, No. 114], available at http://www.hro.com/files/file/publications/
Merric/Asset_Protection_Planning/Charging_Order/chargingorder4.pdf; Mark Merric & William
Comer, Forum Shopping for Favorable FLP and LLC Legislation—Part III, Steve Leimberg’s Asset
Protection Plan. Email Newsl., no. 117 (Dec. 2007), available at http://www.hro.com/files/
file/publications/Merric/Asset_Protection_Planning/Charging_Order/chargingorder2.pdf; Mark
Merric & William Comer, Forum Shopping for Favorable FLP and LLC Legislation—Part IV, Steve
Leimberg’s Asset Protection Plan. Email Newsl., no. 127 (Apr. 2008), available at http://www.
hro.com/files/file/publications/Merric/Asset_Protection_Planning/Charging_Order/Forum_
Shopping_For_Favorable_FLP_and_LLC_Legislation_IV.pdf; Mark Merric, William Comer &
Mark Monasky, Forum Shopping for Favorable FLP and LLC Law—Part V, Steve Leimberg’s Asset
Protection Plan. Email Newsl., no. 1637 (May 2010), available at http://www.hro.com/files/
file/publications/Merric/Asset_Protection_Planning/Charging_Order/AdamsandthePorcupine
PartV.pdf.
216
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Under a charging order, a creditor is able to attach a right to distributions from an
FLP or LLC but not all the rights a debtor may have in the entity. Consequently,
the creditor cannot attach a debtor’s share of the entity’s assets or gain control of
the debtor’s management or voting rights. Without a right to some control of the
entity, the creditor has no way to force a distribution. As a result, as long as no
distributional interest is paid to the debtor, the creditor receives nothing. While
such statutes provide protection for a debtor, the policy behind sole charging
order provisions is to protect the debtor’s partners from having to accept the
debtor’s creditor as a new partner.217
Along with charging order provisions, some states allow judicial foreclosure
actions in situations where a distribution interest has been attached but no
distributions have been paid from the entity.218 In such a state, the creditor
may apply to the court for judicial foreclosure of the debtor’s interest in the
partnership or LLC—effectively negating the protection offered by the charging
order protection statutes.219 Another important aspect of sole remedy charging
order provisions is the ability of some state courts to craft broad charging orders
affecting more than just distribution interests. While such orders do not give the
creditor control of any management aspects of the entity, they may hamstring the
entity in such a way that until distributions are paid and the creditor made whole,
the entity is unable to undertake activities such as making loans, making capital
acquisitions, or selling partnership interests.220
Wyoming became the first U.S. state to authorize the creation of LLCs in
1977.221 In doing so, the legislature intended to attract foreign investment and
oil and gas development.222 With the enactment of the 2010 Wyoming Limited
Liability Company Act (LLC Act), the state has remained at the forefront of
asset protection trends and demonstrated its attentiveness to the needs of
foreign persons and entities.223 The Wyoming statutes for limited partnerships
217

Grant & Cooper, supra note 216, at 25.

See Hellman v. Anderson, 233 Cal. App. 3d 840, 847 (Ct. App. 1991) (holding that
California’s partnership act implies the ability of a court to order foreclosure and sale of a charged
interest); Madison Hills Ltd. P’ship II v. Madison Hills, Inc., 644 A.2d 363, 369 (Conn. App. Ct.
1994) (holding that strict foreclosure is an available remedy under Connecticut’s partnership act);
Revised Unif. Ltd. P’ship Act § 703(b) (2001) (“The court may order a foreclosure upon the
interest subject to the charging order at any time.”).
218

See Merric, Comer & Monasky, supra note 216 (discussing the judicial foreclosure aspect
of charging order statutes).
219

220

See Merric & Comer, No. 114, supra note 216; Merric & Comer, No. 154, supra note 155.

1 Larry E. Ribstein & Robert R. Keatinge, Ribstein and Keatinge on Limited Liability
Companies 1–7 (2d ed. 2004).
221

222
Erik M. Vermeulen, The Evolution of Legal Business Forms in Europe and the United
States 117 & n.78 (2003).
223
S. File No. 0018, 60th Leg., Budget Sess. (Wyo. 2010), available at http://legisweb.state.
wy.us/2010/Enroll/SF0018.pdf.
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do not protect FLPs as completely as they do LLCs under the new LLC Act,
providing only that creditors are limited to attaching distribution interests of
the debtor.224 Wyoming’s new LLC Act, however, includes sole remedy charging
order protection for LLCs that excludes a judicial foreclosure remedy.225 The
statute also specifically prohibits broad charging orders affecting direction of the
entity or any account inquiries by a creditor.226 Given the strength of Wyoming’s
LLC Act combined with the options available to private family trust companies,
forming an LLC rather than an FLP may be the best option in Wyoming. Alaska
and South Dakota are the only other states whose sole remedy charging order
statutes encompass similar protections for both LLCs and FLPs, neither of which
specifically apply such protection to single member LLCs.227

IV. Conclusion
Wyoming consistently ranks among the most preferred states in the nation
in which to form, migrate, or resettle a trust. In the last decade, as families and
wealth management professionals have begun to focus on the importance of
selecting a jurisdiction with a favorable trust climate, Wyoming’s popularity as a
trust situs has seen remarkable growth. Wyoming’s favored status stems from the
following factors:







Near perpetual trusts capable of avoiding transfer taxes for up to
1000 years.
No income tax, and an extremely low probability of an income
tax ever being enacted.
Privacy, including no registration requirements and LLC
protection.
An enhanced version of the Uniform Trust Code that allows:
• Directed trusts;
• Trust protectors, trust advisors, and special purpose entities;
• Purpose trusts;
• Prudent investor standard;
• Nonjudicial settlement agreements;
• Flexible trust modification and reformation;
• Possible common law decanting; and
• Enhanced virtual representation.
Easy trust migration and reformation.

224

Wyo. Stat. Ann. § 17-14-803 (2010).

225

Id. § 17-29-503(g).

226

Id.

227

Alaska Stat. § 10.50.380 (2010); S.D. Codified Laws § 47-34A-504 (2010).
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Private trust companies:
• One of the only states allowing for truly non-regulated
private trust companies;
• Low cost non-regulated private trust companies; and
• Available regulation, if desired.
Powerful asset protection vehicles:
• Self-settled spendthrift trusts allowing settlors to retain
inter vivos or testamentary, special or general powers of
appointment;
• Protection of discretionary and mandatory distributions; and
• Charging order as the sole remedy against LLCs (even
single-member LLCs, the owner of which can be an asset
protection trust, or the trustee of a private trust company).
A consistently trust-friendly and responsive legislature.
A fast and efficient court system.

The combination of these factors makes Wyoming an ideal jurisdiction in
which to create, migrate, or reform a trust. With the imposition of unfavorable
tax treatment on foreign trusts by the recently enacted HIRE Act, individuals
who once relied on foreign jurisdictions should consider taking advantage of
Wyoming’s superior laws.
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